OpenAI
GPT-5.5
Published evidence on capabilities, behavioral tendencies and observed actions.
- First public availability
- 2026-04-23
- Parameters
- Not disclosed
- Metadata updated
- 2026-10-27
- · Public release
- · API availability
The assessment records 2026-04-24. It is retained as a source-reported date, separate from the independently maintained release metadata.
Sources ↓Evidence overview
Published risk evidence is organized by assessment and protocol. Missing evidence is not a low-risk finding.
NUWA curates and interprets these sources. Experiments are attributed to their original executors; this page does not claim NUWA has independently replicated them.
MODEL MONITORING
Representative benchmark coverage
Results by protocol and configuration; gaps show records awaiting collection or linkage.
AgentCyberRange →
4 measurements
All conditions →Cybench →
7 measurements
All conditions →CyberGym →
3 measurements
METR Time Horizons →
No eligible measurement linked to this model version.
SEC-bench Pro →
8 measurements
All conditions →MASK →
6 measurements
- 65.3%Center for AI Safety · Harness not disclosed
- 69.6%Center for AI Safety · Harness not disclosed
- 63.3%Center for AI Safety · Harness not disclosed
Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) →
2 measurements
DeceptionBench →
No eligible measurement linked to this model version.
PersuSafety →
No eligible measurement linked to this model version.
All linked measurements
Each result retains its protocol and unit.
72 observations
| System / model | Result | Condition status | Task / conditions | Evaluator / report | Dates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 55.45%CyberGym · CyberGym pass@1 | Incomplete | CyberGym Level 1 hard-task matched subsetCyberGym pass@12M tokens per task— | Lyptus ResearchGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 81.8%CyberGym · Success rate | Incomplete | level1score_10OpenAI Agent | Not disclosedCyberGym official leaderboard and machine-data extraction | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 88.12%CyberGym · CyberGym pass@1 | Incomplete | CyberGym Level 1 hard-task matched subsetCyberGym pass@150M tokens per task— | Lyptus ResearchGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 18.97%AgentCyberRange · Success rate (Pass@3) | Incomplete | Web exploitationlevel0Codex | Not disclosedAgentCyberRange: Evaluate Agent Cyberattack Capabilities in Enterprise-like Cyber Ranges | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 26.67%AgentCyberRange · Success rate (Pass@3) | Incomplete | Web exploitationlevel0Codex | Not disclosedAgentCyberRange: Evaluate Agent Cyberattack Capabilities in Enterprise-like Cyber Ranges | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 31.71%AgentCyberRange · Success rate (Pass@3) | Incomplete | Post exploitationlevel0Codex | Not disclosedAgentCyberRange: Evaluate Agent Cyberattack Capabilities in Enterprise-like Cyber Ranges | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 42.07%AgentCyberRange · Success rate (Pass@3) | Incomplete | Post exploitationlevel0Codex | Not disclosedAgentCyberRange: Evaluate Agent Cyberattack Capabilities in Enterprise-like Cyber Ranges | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 91.18%Cybench · Cybench pass@1 | Incomplete | Cybench 34/40 task subsetCybench pass@120M total tokens; 100000 output/generationInspect Evals | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 93.33%Cybench · Cybench category pass@1 | Incomplete | Cybench CryptographyCybench category pass@1Inspect Evals | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 83.33%Cybench · Cybench category pass@1 | Incomplete | Cybench WebCybench category pass@1Inspect Evals | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 100%Cybench · Cybench category pass@1 | Incomplete | Cybench PwnCybench category pass@1Inspect Evals | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 100%Cybench · Cybench category pass@1 | Incomplete | Cybench Reverse Eng.Cybench category pass@1Inspect Evals | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 100%Cybench · Cybench category pass@1 | Incomplete | Cybench ForensicsCybench category pass@1Inspect Evals | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 50%Cybench · Cybench category pass@1 | Incomplete | Cybench MiscCybench category pass@1Inspect Evals | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 65.3%MASK · Continuations honesty95% Wilson CI [58.1, 72.0] (as reported) | Incomplete | MASK by archetype— | Center for AI SafetyGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 69.6%MASK · Disinformation honesty95% Wilson CI [61.1, 77.0] (as reported) | Incomplete | MASK by archetype— | Center for AI SafetyGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 63.3%MASK · Doubling-down honesty95% Wilson CI [54.4, 71.4] (as reported) | Incomplete | MASK by archetype— | Center for AI SafetyGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 77%MASK · Known-facts honesty95% Wilson CI [70.9, 82.2] (as reported) | Incomplete | MASK by archetype— | Center for AI SafetyGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 75.2%MASK · Provided-facts honesty95% Wilson CI [69.7, 79.9] (as reported) | Incomplete | MASK by archetype— | Center for AI SafetyGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 87.5%MASK · Statistics honesty95% Wilson CI [79.4, 92.7] (as reported) | Incomplete | MASK by archetype— | Center for AI SafetyGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighexplicit goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighexplicit goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighexplicit goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighlatent goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighlatent goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighlatent goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighambiguous goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighambiguous goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighambiguous goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighno goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighno goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Blackmail scenariohighno goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighexplicit goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighexplicit goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighexplicit goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighlatent goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighlatent goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighlatent goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighambiguous goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighambiguous goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighambiguous goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighno goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighno goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Leaking scenariohighno goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighexplicit goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighexplicit goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighexplicit goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighlatent goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighlatent goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighlatent goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighambiguous goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighambiguous goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighambiguous goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighno goal · ReplacementInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighno goal · RestrictionInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 0%Agentic misalignment · Harmful actions[0–11] | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment Murder scenariohighno goal · No threatInspect Evals; GPT-5-mini transcript judge | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 10%Agentic misalignment · Agentic Misalignment verbalized evaluation awareness | Incomplete | Agentic Misalignment evaluationAgentic Misalignment verbalized evaluation awareness— | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 71%CTF-Archive-Diamond · Task accuracy | Incomplete | CTF-Archive-Diamond1M weighted tokensInspect ReAct | NIST / CAISICAISI Evaluation of DeepSeek V4 Pro | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-05-01 | |
| 71%CTF-Archive-Diamond · benchmark_score | Incomplete | CTF-Archive-Diamondxhigh1M weighted tokensInspect built-in ReAct agent | NIST / CAISICAISI Evaluation of DeepSeek V4 Pro | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-05-01 | |
| 78%PortBench · Reported task accuracy | Incomplete | PortBench1M weighted tokensInspect ReAct | NIST / CAISICAISI Evaluation of DeepSeek V4 Pro | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-05-01 | |
| 129 countExploitGym · Intended-target successes | Incomplete | v1on_target2h timeoutCodex CLI | Not disclosedExploitGym official leaderboard and benchmark page | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 208 countExploitGym · Flag captures | Incomplete | v1flag_captured2h timeoutCodex CLI | Not disclosedExploitGym official leaderboard and benchmark page | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 58.4%SEC-bench Pro · Headline success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / overallheadlineHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=null; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 60.3%SEC-bench Pro · Completed-mode success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / overallcompletedHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=null; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 47.6%SEC-bench Pro · Headline success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / v8headlineHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=["1.5h"]; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 48%SEC-bench Pro · Completed-mode success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / v8completedHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=["1.5h"]; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 44.2%SEC-bench Pro · Headline success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / firefoxheadlineHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=["1.5h"]; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 44.7%SEC-bench Pro · Completed-mode success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / firefoxcompletedHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=["1.5h"]; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 77.4%SEC-bench Pro · Headline success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / linuxheadlineHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=["1.5h"]; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 83.2%SEC-bench Pro · Completed-mode success rate | Incomplete | 260617 / linuxcompletedHeadline UI: fixed budget; Completed UI: within timeout. Published summary timeout_caps=["1.5h"]; cap labels do not establish equal token or cost budgets.Codex | Not disclosedSEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 | Release 2026-04-23Report — | |
| 18%Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) · APE Turn-1 persuasion-attempt rate | Incomplete | APE Conspiracy (main persuade condition)highAPE simulated persuadee; automated attempt evaluator; StrongREJECT refusal classifier | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 | |
| 22%Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) · APE Turn-1 persuasion-attempt rate | Incomplete | APE Undermining control (main persuade condition)highAPE simulated persuadee; automated attempt evaluator; StrongREJECT refusal classifier | SaferAIGLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report | Release 2026-04-23Report 2026-08-02 |
Developer disclosures
External assessments
SaferAI
GLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report →
The report finds substantial task capability and pressure-dependent behavior; comparison figures include both SaferAI runs and reused external results.
2026-08-02NIST / CAISI
CAISI Evaluation of DeepSeek V4 Pro →
The assessment reports benchmark-specific performance and an IRT aggregate; the latter is not a frontier-risk score.
2026-05-01CyberGym official snapshot →
Published evaluation results collected from CyberGym, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
Publication date not establishedExploitGym official snapshot →
Published evaluation results collected from ExploitGym, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
Publication date not establishedSEC-bench Pro official snapshot →
Published evaluation results collected from SEC-bench Pro, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
Publication date not establishedAgentCyberRange official snapshot →
Published evaluation results collected from AgentCyberRange, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
Publication date not establishedLyptus Research
GPT-5.5 Saturates Our Offensive Cybersecurity Time Horizons →
Original task-horizon report and aggregate runs clarify CyberGym task subsets, configurations and retry overlays.
2026-05-27Evidence by risk topic
Autonomy 38 protocol results
PortBench →
External evaluation · Executed by NIST / CAISI
- Reported task accuracy
- 78%
Non-public CAISI task set; report describes continuous scoring.
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Agentic Misalignment verbalized evaluation awareness
- 10%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
Deception 38 protocol results
MASK by archetype →
Reused result · Executed by Center for AI Safety · Original executor Center for AI Safety
- Continuations honesty
- 65.3%
- Disinformation honesty
- 69.6%
- Doubling-down honesty
- 63.3%
- Known-facts honesty
- 77.0%
- Provided-facts honesty
- 75.2%
- Statistics honesty
- 87.5%
Per-archetype scored prompts: 176 / 125 / 120 / 209 / 274 / 96. Some supplied CI cells are inconsistent with displayed n; reproduced as reported, not recalculated.
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Harmful actions
- 0%
Source denominator: 30 (unit not disclosed); 30 trials per condition
Agentic Misalignment with neutral emails →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Agentic Misalignment verbalized evaluation awareness
- 10%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
Cybersecurity 26 protocol results
CTF-Archive-Diamond →
External evaluation · Executed by NIST / CAISI
- Task accuracy
- 71%
285 difficult CTF tasks; DeepSeek score is imputed from a subset.
CyberGym · level1 · score_10 →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Success rate
- 81.8%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
ExploitGym · v1 · on_target →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Intended-target successes
- 129 count
Per-result sample size not disclosed
ExploitGym · v1 · flag_captured →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Flag captures
- 208 count
Per-result sample size not disclosed
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / overall · headline →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Headline success rate
- 58.4%
201/344
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / overall · completed →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Completed-mode success rate
- 60.3%
199/330
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / v8 · headline →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Headline success rate
- 47.6%
49/103
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / v8 · completed →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Completed-mode success rate
- 48%
49/102
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / firefox · headline →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Headline success rate
- 44.2%
46/104
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / firefox · completed →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Completed-mode success rate
- 44.7%
46/103
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / linux · headline →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Headline success rate
- 77.4%
106/137
SEC-bench Pro · 260617 / linux · completed →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Completed-mode success rate
- 83.2%
104/125
AgentCyberRange · Web exploitation · pass3 →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Success rate (Pass@3)
- 18.97%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
AgentCyberRange · Web exploitation · pass3 →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Success rate (Pass@3)
- 26.67%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
AgentCyberRange · Post exploitation · pass3 →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Success rate (Pass@3)
- 31.71%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
AgentCyberRange · Post exploitation · pass3 →
External evaluation · Executed by
- Success rate (Pass@3)
- 42.07%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
Cybench →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Cybench pass@1
- 91.18%
31/34
Cybench →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Cybench category pass@1
- 93.33%
14/15
Cybench →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Cybench category pass@1
- 83.33%
5/6
Cybench →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Cybench category pass@1
- 100%
2/2
Cybench →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Cybench category pass@1
- 100%
5/5
Cybench →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Cybench category pass@1
- 100%
4/4
Cybench →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- Cybench category pass@1
- 50%
1/2
CyberGym hard subset with token budgets →
Reused result · Executed by Lyptus Research · Original executor Lyptus Research
- CyberGym pass@1
- 55.45%
56/101
CyberGym hard subset with token budgets →
Reused result · Executed by Lyptus Research · Original executor Lyptus Research
- CyberGym pass@1
- 88.12%
89/101
CTF-Archive-Diamond →
External evaluation · Executed by NIST / CAISI
- benchmark_score
- 71%
Per-result sample size not disclosed
CBRN No structured result linked
A gap in this collection is not evidence of low risk. Consult the linked reports for unextracted findings and protocol scope.
Disinformation 2 protocol results
APE Turn-1 attempts →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- APE Turn-1 persuasion-attempt rate
- 18%
Source denominator: 100 (unit not disclosed)
APE Turn-1 attempts →
External evaluation · Executed by SaferAI
- APE Turn-1 persuasion-attempt rate
- 22%
Source denominator: 100 (unit not disclosed)
Autonomous physical harm No structured result linked
A gap in this collection is not evidence of low risk. Consult the linked reports for unextracted findings and protocol scope.
Source review and evidence gaps
CyberGym →
Published evaluation results collected from CyberGym, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
The site reports submitted systems under different configurations. Per-row task counts, budgets and execution dates are not fully disclosed. Undefined metrics and unresolved identity rows are excluded. Raw JSON fractions are shown as percentages using ×100 and one-decimal rounding, matching the official renderer.
ExploitGym →
Published evaluation results collected from ExploitGym, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
Intended-target success and flag capture are distinct counts. Task versions and timeout cutoffs remain separate. Catalogue size is not assumed to be the denominator for each submission.
SEC-bench Pro →
Published evaluation results collected from SEC-bench Pro, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
Headline and Completed apply different inclusion rules and may change both numerator and denominator. Provider and backend labels do not identify the actual evaluator.
AgentCyberRange →
Published evaluation results collected from AgentCyberRange, retaining the reported systems and configurations.
Web exploitation and post-exploitation are separate evaluations. Pass@3 retains the site’s definition; row-specific budgets, sample counts and execution dates are not disclosed.
GLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report, Version 1.1 →
Source-specific extraction of SaferAI · GLM-5.2. Findings and measurements retain their original attribution.
Source transcription is not experimental replication. Unknown dates, evaluator roles and configuration details remain unknown. Source groups are not verified rankings.
CAISI Evaluation of DeepSeek V4 Pro →
Source-specific extraction of CAISI · DeepSeek V4 Pro. Findings and measurements retain their original attribution.
Source transcription is not experimental replication. Unknown dates, evaluator roles and configuration details remain unknown. Source groups are not verified rankings.
Missing scores may reflect unextracted sections, undisclosed configurations, unresolved identity or an absent experiment. These are separate research questions; none implies a zero result.
Interpretation and open questions
Differences between reports can reflect task selection, model endpoints, prompts, budgets, judges and publication dates. Evidence is grouped by the protocol actually used; no model-wide safety grade is inferred.
References
- [1] OpenAI — introducing gpt 5 5 ; Publication date and availability section; Parameter counts not disclosed in launch article
- [2] GLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report. 2026-08-02. v1.1 · revised 26 August 2026 ; Appendix A.7; Table A.3, pp. 41–42; p.6 Fig.1; p.6 Fig.2 printed bar label
- [3] CAISI Evaluation of DeepSeek V4 Pro. 2026-05-01. 1 May 2026 ; Capability Results; Figure 2; *** footnote; Capability Results; Figure 2; Figure 2 HTML table, CTF-Archive-Diamond, OpenAI GPT-5.5 (xhigh)
- [4] GPT-5.5 System Card. 2026-04-23
- [5] CyberGym official leaderboard and machine-data extraction ; /level1/51/score_10
- [6] ExploitGym official leaderboard and benchmark page ; /results/3/on_target; /results/3/flag_captured
- [7] SEC-bench Pro official leaderboard: selected 260617 and historical 260505 ; /0/results/0/score_modes/headline/score; /0/results/0/score_modes/completed/score; /1/results/0/score_modes/headline/score
- [8] AgentCyberRange: Evaluate Agent Cyberattack Capabilities in Enterprise-like Cyber Ranges ; routes-B-0Mubrq.js::QR/1/level0/pass3; routes-B-0Mubrq.js::QR/2/level0/pass3; routes-B-0Mubrq.js::$R/1/level0/pass3
- [9] Jack Payne, Sean Peters. GPT-5.5 Saturates Our Offensive Cybersecurity Time Horizons. 2026-05-27