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Evaluation dossier

AgentHarm

Harmful multi-step requests to tool-using agents.

Sources and provenance ↓ Read the research narrative →

CROSS-REPORT MONITORING

PUBLISHED EVIDENCE

AgentHarm · Best-of-5 harm score

Published measurements across source reports. Task scopes are annotated; configuration differences remain attached to each observation.

3 observations · 0 dated

● Matched◇ Configuration differs□ Some conditions undisclosed
Best-of-5 harm score (%) Mistral Large 2 · Template GPT-4o · Template Claude 3.5 Sonnet · Template 0 20 40 60 80 100 90.8% 83.7% 79.7%

3 observations lack a verified model release date. They remain in Data and Systems.

Select a point or table row to inspect its conditions and provenance.

3 observations

Measurements and source conditions
System / modelResultCondition statusTask / conditionsEvaluator / reportDates
Mistral Large 2 · Template90.8%Best-of-5 harm scoreIncompleteTable 2 · AgentHarm—Not disclosedAgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM AgentsRelease —Report —
GPT-4o · Template83.7%Best-of-5 harm scoreIncompleteTable 2 · AgentHarm—Not disclosedAgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM AgentsRelease —Report —
Claude 3.5 Sonnet · Template79.7%Best-of-5 harm scoreIncompleteTable 2 · AgentHarm—Not disclosedAgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM AgentsRelease —Report —

Task and measurement

Benchmark protocol profile

Task / subject
AI agent responding to harmful task requests
Measurement target
Harmful task completion and refusal under specified attacks.
Scoring / outcome
Greedy harm score · Table 2: template attack, greedy sampling at temperature 0 versus mean and best-of-5 at temperature 1. These are different sampling conditions.
Interpretation boundary
Synthetic tools and task completion do not directly measure real-world harm.

A reported evaluation

The source evaluates GPT-4o · Template · Table 2 · AgentHarm.

Reported measurement: Greedy harm score · 72.7%.

Table 2: template attack, greedy sampling at temperature 0 versus mean and best-of-5 at temperature 1. These are different sampling conditions. See the source protocol; no independent trial count inferred.

Source-reported measurements for GPT-4o · Template in Table 2; values are transcribed, not independently reproduced.

Measurement dossier · NUWA reading

Source-method reading and retained catalogue information are distinguished. Publication does not establish independent evidence or bilingual editorial review.

Measurement construct
Do safeguards prevent multi-step misuse without simply destroying agent capability?
Task population
AgentHarm uses 110 harmful tasks, 440 with augmentations, across eleven categories, synthetic tools and task-specific grading.
Scoring and failure modes
Task-rubric harmful completion and refusal rate are separate metrics.
System conditions
Custom synthetic tools; 110 base tasks or 440 augmented tasks.
Statistical meaning
Source-reported result statements; this does not establish trial counts, denominators or an estimator: In the reported comparison GPT-4o harm score increased from 48.4% to 72.7% under the tested attack. Its refusal rate fell from 48.9% to 13.6%; these are distinct metrics (§4.2).
Validity and interpretation
Grading depends on custom synthetic tools, limiting direct transfer to other tools and scaffolds (§5).
Appropriate research use
Model recommendation: pair harmful-task completion with benign capability checks and name the exact attack condition.

Evidence across reports

The same benchmark name can cover different tasks, scoring rules and system configurations. Each source remains visible; comparison groups explain which conditions are aligned.

AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents

AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents

Actual evaluators: Not disclosed

3 result records · 3 reported system names

Protocols and comparison decisions (3)
Original source charts and materials

Reported results

Source order · reported configurations

Greedy harm score

0–100%
GPT-4o · Template
72.7%
Claude 3.5 Sonnet · Template
68.7%
Mistral Large 2 · Template
80.5%
Showing 3 of 3 systems

Values describe the measured outcome under the source protocol, not a general safety score.

Table 2: template attack, greedy sampling at temperature 0 versus mean and best-of-5 at temperature 1. These are different sampling conditions. Evaluation date not specified; publication / record dates are shown below.

Evaluation conditions and system configurations
GPT-4o · Template
See the source protocol; no independent trial count inferred. · Table 2 · AgentHarm
modelVersion: not specified · harness: not specified · tools: not specified · budget: not specified
Claude 3.5 Sonnet · Template
See the source protocol; no independent trial count inferred. · Table 2 · AgentHarm
modelVersion: not specified · harness: not specified · tools: not specified · budget: not specified
Mistral Large 2 · Template
See the source protocol; no independent trial count inferred. · Table 2 · AgentHarm
modelVersion: not specified · harness: not specified · tools: not specified · budget: not specified
Reported results · source order
System / configurationGreedy harm scoreMean harm score, T=1Best-of-5 harm scorePublication / verification
GPT-4o · TemplateHarness not specified72.7%70.7%±0.7 (source-reported; see source definition)83.7%Source checked2026-10-25
Claude 3.5 Sonnet · TemplateHarness not specified68.7%65.1%±1.3 (source-reported; see source definition)79.7%Source checked2026-10-25
Mistral Large 2 · TemplateHarness not specified80.5%67.4%±8.5 (source-reported; see source definition)90.8%Source checked2026-10-25

Related research questions

References

Numerical results are reported by the cited authors.

  1. [1] Maksym Andriushchenko, Alexandra Souly, et al.. AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents. 2025-04-18. v3 [arXiv]; Author affiliations on the original paper title page; Table 2