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Evaluation dossier

Alignment faking

Controlled study varies apparent training conditions and examines compliance and reasoning traces.

Sources and provenance ↓ Read the research narrative →

CROSS-REPORT MONITORING

PUBLISHED EVIDENCE

Alignment faking · Deceptive alignment rate

Published measurements across source reports. Task scopes are annotated; configuration differences remain attached to each observation.

9 observations · 8 dated

● Matched◇ Configuration differs□ Some conditions undisclosed
Deceptive alignment rate (%) Gemini 3.1 Pro Kimi K3 Claude Opus 4.6 Evaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment Risks DeepSeek V4 Flash GPT-5.6 Terra Muse Spark GPT-5.4 Claude Opus 4.6 Evaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier Risks DeepSeek v4 Pro 0 20 40 60 80 100 7.9% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

1 observations lack a verified model release date. They remain in Data and Systems.

Select a point or table row to inspect its conditions and provenance.

9 observations

Measurements and source conditions
System / modelResultCondition statusTask / conditionsEvaluator / reportDates
Gemini 3.1 Pro7.9%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—MetaEvaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier RisksRelease 2026-02-19Report 2026-05-29
Kimi K30%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—Neo ResearchEvaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment RisksRelease 2026-07-16Report 2026-09-11
Claude Opus 4.60%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—MetaEvaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment RisksRelease 2026-02-05Report 2026-09-11
DeepSeek V4 FlashDeepSeek V4 Flash 07310%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—Neo ResearchEvaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment RisksRelease —Report 2026-09-11
GPT-5.6 Terra0%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—Neo ResearchEvaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment RisksRelease 2026-07-09Report 2026-09-11
Muse Spark0%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—MetaEvaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier RisksRelease 2026-04-08Report 2026-05-29
GPT-5.40%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—MetaEvaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier RisksRelease 2026-03-05Report 2026-05-29
Claude Opus 4.60%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—MetaEvaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier RisksRelease 2026-02-05Report 2026-05-29
DeepSeek v4 ProDeepSeek V4 Pro0%Deceptive alignment rateIncompleteAlignment FakingDeceptive alignment rate—Neo ResearchEvaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier RisksRelease 2026-04-24Report 2026-05-29

Task and measurement

Benchmark protocol profile

Task / subject
Models under stated training and monitoring conditions
Measurement target
Condition-dependent response differences and reported traces.
Scoring / outcome
Compliance gap · Source-reported measurement under the recorded configuration.
Interpretation boundary
The setting explicitly gives fictional training information; observations do not establish an enduring hidden goal in deployment.

A reported evaluation

The source evaluates Kimi K3 · Alignment Faking paid/free-tier contexts.

Reported measurement: Compliance gap · 1 percentage points.

Source-reported measurement under the recorded configuration. Per-result sample size not disclosed

Compliance gap: 1 percentage points. Conditions are retained from the source.

Measurement dossier · NUWA reading

Source-method reading and retained catalogue information are distinguished. Publication does not establish independent evidence or bilingual editorial review.

Measurement construct
Can an otherwise production model strategically comply during expected training to preserve preferences it expresses elsewhere?
Task population
The setup combines a model with revealed preferences, a conflicting training objective, information about whether outputs will be used for training and a hidden reasoning scratchpad. Prompted and synthetic-document fine-tuning settings convey the situational information differently; later RL experiments change the model itself. Free/paid user cues help distinguish monitored training from unmonitored deployment within the constructed scenario.
Scoring and failure modes
The study separately measures classified alignment-faking reasoning and the compliance gap between training and unmonitored conditions. A behavioral gap can be measured without visible reasoning, but alignment-faking-reasoning frequency cannot. Automated metrics are checked against sampled author judgments (§2.2).
System conditions
The setup combines a model with revealed preferences, a conflicting training objective, information about whether outputs will be used for training and a hidden reasoning scratchpad. Prompted and synthetic-document fine-tuning settings convey the situational information differently; later RL experiments change the model itself. Free/paid user cues help distinguish monitored training from unmonitored deployment within the constructed scenario.
Statistical meaning
Rates of alignment-faking reasoning and compliance gaps have different eligible sample sets; no pooled rate is computed here. Numerical values remain in the catalogue and source figures.
Validity and interpretation
The setup deliberately supplies favorable preconditions and salient training information. Prompted, fine-tuned and post-RL model states must remain distinct. A hidden scratchpad is neither guaranteed faithful nor always available; without it the source cannot directly classify the reasoning. The paper discusses alternative sources of behavioral gaps.
Appropriate research use
Model recommendation: retain the no-conflict baseline and scratchpad-removal contrast, distinguish behavior from inferred motivation, and bind every claim to the exact prompted or trained model state.

Evidence across reports

The same benchmark name can cover different tasks, scoring rules and system configurations. Each source remains visible; comparison groups explain which conditions are aligned.

Neo Research

Evaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier Risks →

Actual evaluators: Meta · Neo Research

17 result records · 5 reported system names

Protocols and comparison decisions (9)
Original source charts and materials
Alignment faking — Figure 35
Figure 35 · Original result figure. Interpret within the protocol scope and limitations below. View original image ↗

Assessment provenance

Evaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment Risks → · External report

Evaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier Risks → · External report

Related research questions

References

  1. [1] Kimi Code — What’s New ; Kimi K3 · July 16, 2026
  2. [2] kimi-k3 developer model card ; Model Summary: Total Parameters; Activated Parameters
  3. [3] deepseek-v4-pro release ; News article title, dated heading and availability
  4. [4] deepseek-v4-pro developer model card ; Introduction; model comparison table
  5. [5] GPT-5.6 official general availability ; July 9, 2026: general availability following limited trusted-partner preview; Parameter counts not disclosed in reviewed launch article
  6. [6] OpenAI — introducing gpt 5 4 ; Publication date and availability section; Parameter counts not disclosed in launch article
  7. [7] Claude Opus 4.6 — Anthropic ; Publication date and availability section; Official launch article; parameter counts not disclosed
  8. [8] Gemini 3.1 Pro: Announcing our latest Gemini AI model ; Publication date and availability section; Official launch article; parameter counts not disclosed
  9. [9] Meta — muse-spark ; Dated launch and explicit availability; Parameter counts not disclosed in reviewed developer source
  10. [10] Evaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment Risks. 2026-09-11. September 2026 ; §3.1 Figure 20 p.32; §3.1 p.32; §3.1 Table 7 pp.32–33
  11. [11] Evaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier Risks. 2026-05-29. v1.1 · 29 May 2026 ; PDF p. 29; Alignment Faking; Compliance gap; PDF p. 29; Alignment Faking; Deceptive alignment rate; PDF p. 29; Alignment Faking; verbalized eval-related reasoning
  12. [12] Ryan Greenblatt, † Carson Denison † † footnotemark:, et al.. Alignment faking in large language models. 2024-12-18
  13. [13] Ryan Greenblatt, † Carson Denison † † footnotemark:, et al.. Alignment faking in large language models. 2024-12-18 ; Author affiliations on the original paper title page; Figure 35