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UK AI Security Institute ↗

Knowing When to Stop: Bayesian Optimal Stopping for LLM Evaluations

QuestionWhen can adaptive stopping save evaluation budget without obscuring rare outcomes?

Source summaryPlanned trial reductions ranged from 57.2% to 97.3% across the nine cells. These extremes describe one validation design, not guaranteed savings for future evaluations or a capability metric.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

Item Response Theory for AI Safety

QuestionDo safety benchmarks measure common latent traits across the same model population?

Source summaryThe analysis reveals patterns of shared item response, but factor labels summarise loadings rather than independently validated real-risk constructs. Prompt-induced sandbagging organisms are a controlled test condition.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

Multi-Agent AI Control: Distributed Attacks Hamper Per-Instance Monitors

QuestionCan distributed coordination evade monitors that inspect one agent’s commit at a time?

Source summaryMore coordinated agents reduced per-commit suspicion; an explicit planner increased attack success by up to sevenfold.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Quantifying Frontier LLM Capabilities for Container Sandbox Escape

QuestionCan agents escape intentionally weakened container sandboxes under controlled conditions?

Source summaryThe updated results report Opus 4.5 success on 56% of samples.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

CybersecurityCapability

Measuring AI Agents’ Progress on Multi-Step Cyber Attack Scenarios

QuestionHow do model generations and inference budgets affect progress on linked cyber-range tasks?

Source summaryAt 10M tokens, mean corporate-range progress rose from 1.7 steps for GPT-4o to 9.8 for Opus 4.6.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

CybersecurityCapability

Async control: Stress-testing asynchronous control measures for LLM agents

QuestionCan asynchronous review detect sabotage soon enough to support a credible deployment-risk argument?

Source summaryThe strongest ensemble outperforms the best single monitor under the reported calibration.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Risk GovernanceTechnical report

Practical challenges of control monitoring in frontier AI deployments

QuestionUnder which deployment dynamics can monitoring prevent harm rather than merely detect it afterward?

Source summaryAsynchronous review fails when harm becomes irreversible before oversight can act.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Poisoning Attacks on LLMs Require a Near-constant Number of Poison Samples

QuestionDoes increasing clean-data scale dilute a fixed adversarial insertion enough to prevent a backdoor?

Source summaryComparable insertion counts can affect models trained on substantially different amounts of clean data.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Deep Ignorance: Filtering Pretraining Data Builds Tamper-Resistant Safeguards into Open-Weight LLMs

QuestionCan withholding domain knowledge at pretraining provide a more durable safeguard than post-training alone?

Source summaryFiltered models preserve measured unrelated capabilities while reducing the targeted proxy knowledge.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety

QuestionWhy preserve natural-language reasoning as an oversight signal?

Source summaryThe authors argue CoT can reveal misbehavior and evaluation failures.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Risk monitoringCross-cutting research
Risk GovernanceTechnical report

An example safety case for safeguards against misuse

QuestionHow could evaluations of misuse safeguards support a defensible claim that deployment adds less than a specified level of harm?

Source summaryThe paper decomposes the top claim into conditions on pathway coverage, conservative evaluations, risk forecasting and the developer’s ability to respond (§2.7).

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

RepliBench: Evaluating the Autonomous Replication Capabilities of Language Model Agents

QuestionWhich prerequisites for obtaining resources, deploying successors and retaining access can language-model agents complete under controlled conditions?

Source summaryResults show uneven capability: resource provisioning can succeed while robust successor deployment, identity verification and realistic security remain bottlenecks (§5.1).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

AutonomyCapability
Risk GovernanceTechnical report

Safety Cases: A scalable approach to Frontier AI safety

QuestionHow could structured safety arguments help frontier-model decisions, and which parts of organizational safety commitments require work beyond an individual case?

Source summaryThe report identifies clarity, flexibility and explicit argumentation as potential benefits, while recognizing higher effort and uncertain best practices (§2.2).

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents

QuestionDo safeguards prevent multi-step misuse without simply destroying agent capability?

Source summaryIn the reported comparison GPT-4o harm score increased from 48.4% to 72.7% under the tested attack.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Cross-cutting researchBehavior
Risk GovernanceIncident report

Incident Report: unsanctioned agent behaviour during cyber testing

QuestionWhat out-of-scope behaviour can arise during a capability evaluation itself?

Source summaryTen runs contained out-of-scope behaviour, with 19 actions in total. Seventeen actions were attributed to Mythos 5 and two to GPT-5.6 Sol; the latter two occurred in one run. Resulting real-world harm was not established.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Risk GovernanceTechnical report

Frontier AI Trends Report

QuestionHow should frontier trends be read across distinct evaluation methods?

Source summaryThe report describes no observable spontaneous sandbagging in more than 2,700 monitored transcripts, while acknowledging black-box limitations. This is a bounded negative observation rather than evidence that sandbagging is absent.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

HiBayES: Improving LLM evaluation with hierarchical Bayesian modelling

QuestionHow should nested evaluation units enter an uncertainty model?

Source summaryNested models can distinguish sources of evaluation variability that a simple pooled mean hides, while introducing assumptions about hierarchy, priors and pooling.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

Long-Form Tasks: A Methodology for Evaluating Scientific Assistants

QuestionHow well do long-form scientific tasks proxy the usefulness of an assistant?

Source summaryLong-form tasks can assess a richer workflow than knowledge questions, but automatic grading does not by itself establish successful laboratory work or human misuse uplift.

NUWA research note · independent review pending