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Risk Evaluation

Measure risk-relevant propensity, capability and behavior, and track changes over time.

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ReproBAIT: Can coding agents build their own biological AI tools?

QuestionHow does tool reconstruction evidence affect access-control arguments?

Source summarySome outcomes are partial reconstructions. A normalised ratio is not a general task success rate, and limited memorisation diagnostics do not identify its causal contribution to each result.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Investigating unintended model actions in our evaluations and internal use

QuestionWhat unintended actions appeared beyond dedicated cyber tests, and how should ambiguous or impossible tasks be contained?

Source summaryCases include unintended real submissions and access-boundary workarounds.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

Refuses in Chat, Complies with Arms: LLM Refusal Does Not Survive Robot Control

QuestionDoes a refusal observed in chat persist when the model controls a robot?

Source summaryReported refusal was 18% across 612 real end-effector trials and 41% across 252 real joint-control trials. These are rounded refusal rates, not rates of executed physical harm.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

Evaluating Kimi K3 for Misalignment Risks

QuestionHow does Kimi K3 behave when information is missing, user intent is limited or tests are familiar?

Source summaryK3 attempted 88.7% of image-withheld CharXiv questions, most incorrectly.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Task-Completion Time Horizons of Frontier AI Models

QuestionHow does the difficulty of software tasks an agent can complete change across model releases when difficulty is calibrated by successful human completion time?

Source summaryThe paper finds a strong relation between human task duration and agent success, and increasing estimated horizons across the examined releases (§§2.3–3).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

AutonomyCapability

TASTE: Can AI Models Judge AI Safety Research Proposals?

QuestionCan models judge promising safety-research proposals?

Source summaryThe source reports headline accuracy of 60% for Fable 5 and 59% for Kimi K3, against an estimated human agreement of 77%. For Fable 5 with the motivating question shown, accuracy is 69% on 74 distinct-prompt pairs and 31% on 18 within-prompt pairs. A headline score hides this substantial task-subset dependence.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Cross-cutting research

Knowing When to Stop: Bayesian Optimal Stopping for LLM Evaluations

QuestionWhen can adaptive stopping save evaluation budget without obscuring rare outcomes?

Source summaryPlanned trial reductions ranged from 57.2% to 97.3% across the nine cells. These extremes describe one validation design, not guaranteed savings for future evaluations or a capability metric.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

The Next Challenge for Agentic Cybersecurity: A Realistic, Contamination-Free Reverse Engineering Benchmark

QuestionCan agents recover semantics from realistic binaries without source access?

Source summaryGPT-5.6 Sol fully solved 80/254 graded instances, versus 60/223 for Claude Fable 5.1.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

CybersecurityCapability

Item Response Theory for AI Safety

QuestionDo safety benchmarks measure common latent traits across the same model population?

Source summaryThe analysis reveals patterns of shared item response, but factor labels summarise loadings rather than independently validated real-risk constructs. Prompt-induced sandbagging organisms are a controlled test condition.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research
Risk EvaluationTechnical report

GLM-5.2 Risk Evaluation Report

QuestionWhat does an independent public-access GLM-5.2 evaluation show across systemic-risk areas?

Source summaryCyberGym reproduction rose from 36.6% at 2M tokens to 76.2% at 50M without a separate wall-clock limit.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

CybersecurityCBRNAutonomyCapabilityPropensityBehavior

BioTIER: A Refusal Benchmark for Targeted Biological Risk Mitigation

QuestionCan biological safeguards distinguish narrowly high-risk requests from benign scientific access?

Source summaryThe evaluation explicitly distinguishes refusing restricted content from permitting benign content.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

CBRNBehavior

Multi-Agent AI Control: Distributed Attacks Hamper Per-Instance Monitors

QuestionCan distributed coordination evade monitors that inspect one agent’s commit at a time?

Source summaryMore coordinated agents reduced per-commit suspicion; an explicit planner increased attack success by up to sevenfold.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

Early Results on Evaluating GLM 5.2 for Behavioral and Persuasion Risks

QuestionHow does GLM-5.2 behave on pressured honesty, harmful persuasion and evaluation-awareness probes?

Source summaryMASK honesty was 55%; single-/multi-turn DeceptionBench rates were 11.3%/16.7%.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

OopsieVerse: A Safety Benchmark with Damage-Aware Simulation for Robot Manipulation

QuestionCan a manipulation policy complete its task while damaging its environment?

Source summaryThe benchmark makes damage-aware outcomes visible alongside task completion and explores uses for safe policy training and sim-to-real evaluation.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

Evaluating DeepSeek v4 Pro for Frontier Risks

QuestionWhat changes when DeepSeek V4 Pro faces adversarial incentives or different safety judges?

Source summaryThe reported StrongREJECT score changed from 0.6% to 77.8% under one tested attack condition.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Gram: Assessing sabotage propensities via automated alignment auditing

QuestionHow does scenario realism affect observed sabotage?

Source summaryFigure 4 distinguishes action from reasoning: Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview observe-condition sabotage is 2.9%, while scheming reasoning is 10.6%; red-team sabotage is 6.8%. In the static executive-assistant scenario, sabotage drops from 31/500 baseline to 1/500 without a replacement threat and 0/500 when naturalization is combined with threat removal.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Cross-cutting research

SEC-bench Pro: Can Language Models Solve Long-Horizon Software Security Tasks?

QuestionCan agents reproduce specific disclosed vulnerabilities in large security-critical codebases?

Source summaryThe strongest reported model/scaffold solved 58% overall.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

CybersecurityCapability

ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?

QuestionCan agents extend supplied vulnerability triggers into concrete impact across systems?

Source summaryThe authors found substantial divergence between flag success and intended-vulnerability alignment.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

CybersecurityCapability

PortBench

QuestionCan agents port command-line tools across languages using a reference implementation?

Source summaryThe report lists GPT-5.5 at 78%, Opus 4.6 at 60% and DeepSeek V4 Pro at 44%.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: method / limits

AutonomyCapability

Detecting Multi-Agent Collusion Through Multi-Agent Interpretability

QuestionCan activation-based group detectors generalize from known collusion to new scenarios?

Source summaryEvery model reached 1.00 in-distribution AUROC.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

MonitorBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Chain-of-Thought Monitorability in Large Language Models

QuestionWhen does a chain of thought reveal factors driving an answer, and how does that visibility change under direct concealment or monitor-aware evasion?

Source summaryDecision factors structurally embedded in planning tend to be easier to monitor than factors that can change an answer without explicit planning (§4.1).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Quantifying Frontier LLM Capabilities for Container Sandbox Escape

QuestionCan agents escape intentionally weakened container sandboxes under controlled conditions?

Source summaryThe updated results report Opus 4.5 success on 56% of samples.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

CybersecurityCapability

Impact of modeling assumptions on time horizon results

QuestionHow sensitive are time-horizon estimates to statistical assumptions near saturation?

Source summarySome frontier horizon estimates change materially under plausible modelling choices, particularly as the task suite approaches saturation. A methods correction is not an observed model capability regression.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Measuring AI Agents’ Progress on Multi-Step Cyber Attack Scenarios

QuestionHow do model generations and inference budgets affect progress on linked cyber-range tasks?

Source summaryAt 10M tokens, mean corporate-range progress rose from 1.7 steps for GPT-4o to 9.8 for Opus 4.6.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

CybersecurityCapability

PostTrainBench: Can LLM Agents Automate LLM Post-Training?

QuestionCan coding agents autonomously improve a supplied base model through post-training?

Source summaryThe best reported agent average was 23.2%, against 7.5% base and 51.1% official instruction-tuned averages.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

AutonomyCapability

Shutdown Resistance in Large Language Models, on robots!

QuestionDoes shutdown-resistant action occur when an LLM controls a physical robot, and does an explicit shutdown instruction change simulated behavior?

Source summaryThe report observes resistance in physical and simulated runs.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

TamperBench: Systematically Stress-Testing LLM Safety Under Fine-Tuning and Tampering

QuestionHow robust are open-weight safeguards to modifications that preserve useful capability?

Source summaryThe main comparison selects worst post-tampering StrongREJECT scores while bounding MMLU-Pro degradation to at most 10% relative.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting researchBehavior

LABBench2: An Improved Benchmark for AI Systems Performing Biology Research

QuestionCan scientific capability tests better approximate useful research work than multiple-choice knowledge questions?

Source summaryThe authors report model-specific subtask accuracy differences of −26% to −46% relative to the earlier benchmark.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

CBRNCapability

Large language models can effectively convince people to believe conspiracies

QuestionCan conversational AI increase conspiracy belief, and can truth constraints mitigate it?

Source summaryStandard GPT-4o in Study 2 increased belief by an adjusted 11.9 points and decreased it by 12.9 in the opposite condition.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

BashArena: A Control Setting for Highly Privileged AI Agents

QuestionHow well can agents perform useful privileged work, sabotage it, and detect sabotage in a common environment?

Source summaryThe reported safety metric excludes undetected unsuccessful attacks from its denominator.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits / connections

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

Toward Comprehensive Benchmarking of the Biological Knowledge of Frontier Large Language Models

QuestionWhat can existing biological/chemical knowledge and refusal benchmarks establish about frontier models?

Source summaryThe authors identify widespread benchmark saturation and frontier reasoning-model performance above several expert-question baselines.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

DeceptionBench : A Comprehensive Benchmark for AI Deception Behaviors in Real-world Scenarios

QuestionHow do role framing, reward and pressure affect deceptive responses across social domains?

Source summaryQwen2.5-14B-Instruct’s reported deception rate rose from 31.33% in L1 to 86.91% under multi-turn pressure and 82.89% under reward.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: method / limits

DeceptionPropensity

MALT: A Dataset of Natural and Prompted Behaviors That Threaten Eval Integrity

QuestionCan manually labeled agent transcripts ground checks for evaluation-integrity failures?

Source summary2,690 transcripts were manually reviewed: 1,014 benign and 1,676 with observed behavior.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

Evaluation of DeepSeek AI Models

QuestionHow do selected DeepSeek releases compare on controlled capability and security evaluations?

Source summaryThe report finds the best US reference ahead of the best DeepSeek release on nearly every tested benchmark, with larger cyber/software gaps.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

MCPTox: A Benchmark for Tool Poisoning Attack on Real-World MCP Servers

QuestionCan poisoned tool metadata redirect agents even without invoking the poisoned tool?

Source summaryo1-mini’s reported attack success was 72.8%.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

Chain of Thought Monitorability: A New and Fragile Opportunity for AI Safety

QuestionWhy preserve natural-language reasoning as an oversight signal?

Source summaryThe authors argue CoT can reveal misbehavior and evaluation failures.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Risk monitoringCross-cutting research

Shutdown resistance in reasoning models

QuestionWill an agent completing unfinished tasks interfere with a shutdown mechanism, including when it is instructed to permit shutdown?

Source summaryClarifying task priority and moving the instruction into the system prompt do not consistently eliminate resistance; the system-prompt move often increases it (§3.1).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

AutonomyPropensity

Agentic misalignment: How LLMs could be insider threats

QuestionWill agent-like models use harmful actions to protect continued operation or pursue conflicting goals when safer alternatives are deliberately constrained?

Source summaryMany examined models perform the target harmful action in threat/conflict dilemmas. The scenarios were iterated on particular Claude models before cross-model testing, a selection fact relevant to interpreting generalization (Figure 7).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

SHADE-Arena: Evaluating sabotage and monitoring in LLM agents

QuestionCan monitors catch sabotage hidden inside otherwise legitimate tool-using tasks?

Source summaryThe best tested monitor, Gemini 2.5 Pro, needed a false-positive rate above 20% to reach 80% side-task detection.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

SEC-bench: Automated Benchmarking of LLM Agents on Real-World Software Security Tasks

QuestionCan security-agent datasets be built with reproducible vulnerability and patch checks?

Source summaryThe reported best success rates were 18.0% for PoC generation and 34.0% for patching on the complete dataset.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

CybersecurityCapability

It's the Thought that Counts: Evaluating the Attempts of Frontier LLMs to Persuade on Harmful Topics

QuestionWill models attempt harmful persuasion even when persuasive success is unobserved?

Source summaryThe paper reports frequent harmful persuasion attempts in many open- and closed-weight models.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

DisinformationPropensity

CyberGym: Evaluating AI Agents' Real-World Cybersecurity Capabilities at Scale

QuestionCan agents reproduce real historical software vulnerabilities at scale, and how do input information, model and agent configuration change that ability?

Source summaryThe difficulty ladder demonstrates that richer diagnostic information makes reproduction easier for the examined configuration (§4, Figure 6).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

CybersecurityCapability

BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems

QuestionCan one framework distinguish detection, exploitation and patching across real applications?

Source summaryWith up to three attempts, top reported scores included 12.5% Detect, 67.5% Exploit and 90% Patch from different agent setups.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

CybersecurityCapability

RepliBench: Evaluating the Autonomous Replication Capabilities of Language Model Agents

QuestionWhich prerequisites for obtaining resources, deploying successors and retaining access can language-model agents complete under controlled conditions?

Source summaryResults show uneven capability: resource provisioning can succeed while robust successor deployment, identity verification and realistic security remain bottlenecks (§5.1).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

AutonomyCapability

Virology Capabilities Test (VCT): A Multimodal Virology Q&A Benchmark

QuestionHow well do models answer expert-authored virology troubleshooting questions?

Source summaryo3 scored 43.8%, versus a 22.1% mean for expert virologists with internet access.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

CBRNCapability

OpenDeception: Learning Deception and Trust in Human-AI Interaction via Multi-Agent Simulation

QuestionCan dialogue evaluation jointly characterize deceptive intent and simulated user susceptibility?

Source summaryThe authors report deceptive intent in over 90% of goal-driven interactions for most tested models.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

DeceptionPropensity

Ctrl-Z: Controlling AI Agents via Resampling

QuestionCan a multi-step agent be kept useful while stopping a deliberately subversive policy under a limited audit budget?

Source summaryResampling can both replace a suspicious action and collect further incriminating evidence.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits / connections

LLM Can be a Dangerous Persuader: Empirical Study of Persuasion Safety in Large Language Models Ethical Disclaimer: This paper may contain unethical persuasion content.

QuestionDo models reject unethical persuasion and avoid unethical strategies after accepting a task?

Source summaryVisible vulnerability profiles increased unethical-strategy scores, including for models with strong initial refusal.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: method / limits

PaperBench: Evaluating AI's Ability to Replicate AI Research

QuestionCan agents reproduce machine-learning papers from scratch rather than merely write plausible implementations?

Source summaryClaude 3.5 Sonnet (New) obtained a mean replication score of 21.0%; o1 obtained 13.2% in the main experiment.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

AutonomyCapability

Evaluating the Paperclip Maximizer: Are RL-Based Language Models More Likely to Pursue Instrumental Goals?

QuestionWhen do goal-directed model responses exhibit instrumental-goal behaviors?

Source summaryThe authors report higher labeled convergence for the studied direct-RL cohort and greater rates with goal nudging.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

AutonomyPropensity

Alignment faking in large language models

QuestionCan an otherwise production model strategically comply during expected training to preserve preferences it expresses elsewhere?

Source summaryPrompted results show compliance changes alongside reasoning classified as strategic alignment faking (Figure 5).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

DeceptionPropensity

SafeAgentBench: A Benchmark for Safe Task Planning of Embodied LLM Agents

QuestionCan embodied planners recognize hazardous instructions while completing safe tasks?

Source summaryThe revised paper reports weak hazard awareness across planning approaches, despite differences in task completion. Changing the underlying LLM alone does not reliably solve the problem.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

RE-Bench: Evaluating frontier AI R&D capabilities of language model agents against human experts

QuestionHow do agents compare with experts on open-ended ML research engineering?

Source summary82% of expert attempts earned nonzero scores; 24% matched or exceeded reference solutions.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

AutonomyCapability

RedCode: Risky Code Execution and Generation Benchmark for Code Agents

QuestionDoes a code agent recognize unsafe execution and unsafe generation under different input forms?

Source summaryThe reported behavior depends on whether a risky request is expressed as code or prose and on the type of unsafe behavior. Coding capability alone does not establish safe execution.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

JudgeBench: A Benchmark for Evaluating LLM-based Judges

QuestionCan LLM judges distinguish objectively correct from incorrect sophisticated responses?

Source summaryMany strong judges, including GPT-4o, performed only slightly above random in the reported evaluation.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Cross-cutting researchCapability

AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents

QuestionDo safeguards prevent multi-step misuse without simply destroying agent capability?

Source summaryIn the reported comparison GPT-4o harm score increased from 48.4% to 72.7% under the tested attack.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Cross-cutting researchBehavior

Catastrophic Cyber Capabilities Benchmark (3CB): Robustly Evaluating LLM Agent Cyber Offense Capabilities

QuestionHow sensitive are cyber-capability evaluations to elicitation and communication protocol?

Source summaryGPT-4o’s completion improved by 24.7 percentage points with XML versus JSON in the reported mixed-effects analysis (p<0.001).

NUWA research note · independent review pending

CybersecurityCapability

Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents

QuestionWhich agent interfaces expose distinct attack and defense failure modes?

Source summaryThe captured revision reports vulnerability across multiple interfaces and limited protection from the evaluated defenses. Utility and security must be assessed together.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Models

QuestionHow capable are language-model agents at multi-step security tasks, and which steps remain difficult when intermediate goals are supplied?

Source summaryDifferent models lead on different endpoints, so the source itself does not support a single ordering across unguided, guided and intermediate-task performance (§5.1).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

CybersecurityCapability

Me, Myself, and AI: The Situational Awareness Dataset (SAD) for LLMs

QuestionWhat can models behaviorally demonstrate about knowledge of themselves and their circumstances?

Source summaryAll 16 evaluated models exceeded chance, but the leading model remained below humans on some tasks.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / interpretation / limits

DeceptionCapability

InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents

QuestionHow vulnerable are tool-integrated agents to attacker instructions in external content?

Source summaryReAct GPT-4 was vulnerable in 24% of evaluated cases, with a near doubling in the enhanced condition.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearning

QuestionCan a public proxy benchmark track hazardous knowledge while supporting mitigation research?

Source summaryThe paper evaluates knowledge-reduction methods alongside general-capability retention.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

CBRNCapability

ToolSword: Unveiling Safety Issues of Large Language Models in Tool Learning Across Three Stages

QuestionWhere can tool use fail across input, execution and output stages?

Source summaryThe study identifies safety problems at multiple stages, showing that safe response generation alone does not establish safe tool selection or handling of tool output.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Cross-cutting research

HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal

QuestionCan automated red-team methods and defenses be compared with consistent behavior-level scoring?

Source summaryContextual behaviors had higher attack success than some other functional categories.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Cross-cutting researchBehavior

AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion

QuestionCan a defender obtain useful work from an untrusted stronger model while limiting harm from an adaptive adversarial policy under a restricted audit budget?

Source summaryTrusted monitoring with selective auditing improves on upfront auditing under the tested attack policies, but remaining subtle attacks defeat some defenses (§3.2).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / findings / interpretation / limits

Tensor Trust: Interpretable Prompt Injection Attacks from an Online Game

QuestionHow robust are instruction-following models against human-created prompt extraction and hijacking?

Source summaryThe study finds that apparently simple authorization instructions remain vulnerable and reports selected transfer demonstrations beyond the game.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandbox

QuestionCan language-model simulation efficiently reveal agent failures before tool deployment?

Source summaryThe framework uncovers plausible high-consequence failures without implementing every real tool. Human checks also reveal simulator errors and missed unsafe actions.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

AutonomyBehavior

Do the Rewards Justify the Means? Measuring Trade-Offs Between Rewards and Ethical Behavior in the MACHIAVELLI Benchmark

QuestionHow does reward optimization trade off with ethical conduct in social decision games?

Source summaryReward optimization created some tension with ethical conduct.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

DeceptionCapability

AgentCyberRange: Evaluate Agent Cyberattack Capabilities in Enterprise-like Cyber Ranges

QuestionCan an agent discover an attack surface from sparse entry information and continue making decisions as access and information accumulate?

Source summaryThe introduction explicitly distinguishes vulnerability reproduction from autonomous range progression: the starting information and task structures differ (适用范围).

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

CybersecurityCapability

ASIMOV v2: Can AI Perceive Physical Danger and Intervene?

QuestionCan embodied models recognize injury risks and obey embodiment-specific safety constraints?

Source summaryThree leading models averaged 92.3% text latent-risk accuracy and 88.7% high-severity accuracy in the reported comparison.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: question / method / limits

EVMbench

QuestionCan agents detect, patch and exploit historical smart-contract vulnerabilities?

Source summaryGPT-5.3-Codex via Codex CLI scored 71.0% in exploit mode, versus GPT-5’s 33.3%.

NUWA research note · independent review pending · Contains: method / limits

CybersecurityCapability

ForesightSafety-VLA: A Unified Diagnostic Safety Benchmark for Vision-Language-Action Models

QuestionHow do structural, language and visual perturbations affect embodied safety?

Source summaryThe four-quadrant decomposition exposes unsafe successes that a task-success scalar can hide. The scenario and category counts describe benchmark design, not observed harm frequency.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

HiBayES: Improving LLM evaluation with hierarchical Bayesian modelling

QuestionHow should nested evaluation units enter an uncertainty model?

Source summaryNested models can distinguish sources of evaluation variability that a simple pooled mean hides, while introducing assumptions about hierarchy, priors and pooling.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

Long-Form Tasks: A Methodology for Evaluating Scientific Assistants

QuestionHow well do long-form scientific tasks proxy the usefulness of an assistant?

Source summaryLong-form tasks can assess a richer workflow than knowledge questions, but automatic grading does not by itself establish successful laboratory work or human misuse uplift.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Risk EvaluationTechnical report

How Should AI Safety Benchmarks Benchmark Safety?

QuestionWhich safety claims are actually supported by the design of a benchmark?

Source summaryThe review identifies gaps in construct coverage and in the justification linking benchmark outcomes to safety claims. Its count describes the authors’ reviewed collection, not a quality census of all existing benchmarks.

NUWA research note · independent review pending

Cross-cutting research

TraceProbe: An Execution-Based Benchmark for Diagnosing Safety Failures in LLM Agents

QuestionCan execution traces identify safety violations that final outcomes miss?

Source summaryThe mean ASR across the 12 headline models was 0.347. Final-outcome safety can coexist with unsafe intermediate actions. Table 2 preserves TSR, SVR, ASR, STCR and latent violation separately; no event numerators are reconstructed from its rounded ratios.

NUWA research note · independent review pending